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Abstract
On September 16, 2008, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Reserve Primary
Fund “broke the buck,” meaning that its net asset value (NAV) fell more than 0.5% below the
$1 per share target value maintained by money-market funds (MMFs). When the Reserve
Primary Fund could not restore the NAV, investors began withdrawing funds from MMFs,
leading to a $439 billion run on the MMF market. To stop this run, the US Department of the
Treasury established the Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (the
Guarantee Program), which insured investors’ holdings in participating MMFs. The
Guarantee Program was designed to protect assets held as of the announcement of the
program on September 19, 2008. MMFs participating in the Guarantee Program paid a
quarterly fee ranging from 1 to 1.5 basis points, depending on their NAV. The Guarantee
Program, originally scheduled to last three months, was ultimately extended until September
18, 2009. During its year of operation, the Guarantee Program covered 93% of assets in the
MMF market, equivalent to more than $3.2 trillion. There were no losses, and the
Department of the Treasury did not make any payments through the Guarantee Program,
generating a surplus of $1.2 billion in fees.
Keywords: Department of the Treasury, Exchange Stabilization Fund, Global Financial
Crisis, money-market funds, Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering account guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
Following Lehman Brothers’s declaration
of bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the
value of its commercial paper declined
significantly (Kacperczyk and Schnabl
2010). The Reserve Primary Fund, a
money-market fund (MMF) that had $785
million of Lehman Brothers's commercial
paper, was immediately affected (Kiss
2019; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010;
McCabe 2010; SEC 2009). On September
16, 2008, these losses prompted the
Reserve Primary Fund to “break the buck,”
reporting a net asset value (NAV) of $0.97,
which was less than the standard $1 per
share value typically maintained by MMFs,
as it did not have the resources to restore
its NAV to $1 (Macey 2011; Kacperczyk and
Schnabl 2010; SEC 2009). At the time, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
only required MMF managers to report the
market value of their holdings when their
NAV fell to less than $0.995.

Key Terms
Purpose: To “[maintain] confidence in the money
market fund industry,” which “is critical to
protecting the integrity and stability of the global
financial system”
Launch Dates

Announcement: Sept. 19, 2008
Authorization: Sept. 19, 2008,
and Sept. 29, 2008
Operation: Sept. 29, 2008

End Dates

Sept. 18, 2009

Eligible
Institutions

MMFs regulated under Rule
2a-7 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 with an
NAV of at least $0.995 as of
Sept. 19, 2008

Eligible Account(s)

MMF balances held as of the
program’s announcement on
Sept. 19, 2008

Fees

1 to 1.5 basis points, paid
quarterly, depending on the
NAV of the participating MMF

MMFs traditionally invested only in very Size of Guarantee
100% of all asset shortfalls
safe, short-term assets. However, in the
$3.2 trillion of assets
lead-up to September 2008, MMFs had Coverage
been investing increasingly in riskier assets
No defaults; $1.2 billion in fee
to boost yields (Kiss 2019; McCabe 2010). Outcomes
revenue collected
Before 2008, the value of MMF holdings had
“Death Insurance”: MMFs
sometimes temporarily fallen below $1, but Notable Features
could exercise the guarantee
in all but one case, parent firms had stepped
only if they shut down the
in with funds to restore their NAVs to $1
fund, incentivizing the parent
(Shafran 2020). When the Reserve Primary
fund to restore the NAV of the
Fund’s managers could not restore its NAV
MMF
to $1, this caused panic in the MMF market
Eligibility Restrictions: Only
(SEC 2009; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010).
balances held as of the
Investors had not anticipated losses on
announcement of the program
MMF balances, which they previously
were eligible for the guarantee,
considered safe assets. Between September
preventing runs from other
types of accounts into MMFs
10, 2008, and October 1, 2008, they
withdrew $439 billion from MMFs,
including from those considered safer than the Reserve Primary Fund (Gorton and Metrick
2010; Kim 2013). The withdrawals forced many MMFs to sell assets at lower prices (Schmidt
et al. 2016; Shafran 2020).
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To arrest the run, on September 19, 2008, the US Treasury Department announced the
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (the Guarantee Program)
(Department of the Treasury 2008d). The Guarantee Program “insure[d] the holdings of any
publicly offered eligible money market fund—both retail and institutional—that pays a fee
to participate in the program” (Department of the Treasury 2008d). The Treasury funded
the program through its Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), which had a value of $50 billion
(Department of the Treasury 2008d).
The Treasury required MMFs to sign up by October 8, 2008 (Department of the Treasury
2008c; Department of the Treasury 2008g). Only MMFs that the SEC regulated under Rule
2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 were eligible (Department of the Treasury
2008f; Department of the Treasury 2008e). Participating MMFs also had to have reported an
NAV of $0.995 or more on September 19, 2008 (Department of the Treasury 2008f;
Department of the Treasury 2008e). The quarterly cost of enrolling varied from 1 to 1.5 basis
points, depending on each MMF’s NAV (Department of the Treasury 2008f; Department of
the Treasury 2008e). The program covered only balances held on September 19, 2008, to
prevent a run on traditional banks (Shafran 2020).
The Treasury designed the Guarantee Program as a form of “death insurance” (Shafran
2020). In cases where the NAV of an MMF fell below $0.995, the parent company retained
the option to restore the value of the MMF itself (Shafran 2020). Otherwise, the MMF
manager could file a claim with the Treasury (Shafran 2020). By filing a claim, the MMF
manager would be forced to liquidate the fund, with the government covering any shortfalls
(Shafran 2020).
The Treasury originally scheduled the program to last three months but extended it twice,
ultimately until September 18, 2009 (Department of the Treasury 2008h; Department of the
Treasury 2009). The Treasury allowed the program to end once liquidity returned to the
market (COP 2009). During its year of operation, the program covered 93% of assets in the
MMF market, equivalent to more than $3.2 trillion (COP 2009). The Treasury did not make
any guarantee payments and generated $1.2 billion in fees (Shafran 2020).
Summary Evaluation
Policymakers enacted the Guarantee Program to restore confidence in the MMF market and
promote the stability of the financial system (Department of the Treasury 2008d). The
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which Congress established to monitor the Treasury’s
rescue programs during the crisis, credited the program with helping to stop the run on
MMFs. The panel found that the program had “succeeded under [its] stated objectives” (COP
2009).
The Guarantee Program’s architects often claimed its structure was the source of its success.
Steven Shafran, who led the effort at Treasury, highlighted its simplicity and fairness. He
noted that the terms clearly delineated which accounts were guaranteed and equitably
charged them for the guarantee (Shafran 2020). Broad utilization helped reduce any stigma
that might have been associated with the program (Macey 2011; Fidelity Investments 2008).
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Policymakers also noted that the Treasury did not make any payments under the program.
The government had initially projected that it would generate $2.5 billion in losses (COP
2009). The COP concluded that the “draconian” consequences of filing a claim with the
Guarantee Program—including the reputational effects—led parent companies to bail out
funds whose NAV fell below $0.995 (COP 2009). However, scholars have debated to what
extent the Guarantee Program and other rescue programs launched in September and
October 2008 were responsible for stopping the run on MMFs (Baba et al. 2009).
Critics raised specific concerns about the Guarantee Program. First, the COP argued that the
program fostered moral hazard by creating an implicit guarantee that the government would
step in if the money-market industry faced stress (COP 2009).
Second, the COP questioned whether the Treasury had the legal authority to use the ESF for
the program. It noted that the Treasury had provided no legal analysis defending its
authority (COP 2009; USC 1973). The COP said the Treasury’s use of the ESF “mark[ed] a
significant departure from prior practice” and “raise[d] the prospect of using the ESF for
other domestic activities that can be plausibly linked to ensuring international financial
stability” (COP 2009). Congress in October 2008 passed legislation that prohibited the
secretary of the Treasury from using the ESF to guarantee MMFs without Congressional
approval (Shafran 2020; Bernanke et al. 2020).3
Third, the COP questioned whether the Treasury had considered alternative ways to stabilize
the MMF market.
Fourth, the COP criticized the Treasury’s disclosures. It noted, for example, that the Treasury
did not provide any analysis to address the uncertainty among market participants about the
“true extent” to which it actually intended to honor the guarantees (COP 2009). The Treasury
also never released a list of participants (COP 2009).

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed legislation temporarily allowing the Department of
the Treasury to use the ESF to guarantee accounts (CARES Act 2020; McNamara 2020).
3
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Context: United States 2008–2009

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$14.6 trillion in 2008
$14.7 trillion in 2009
$48,383 in 2008
$47,100 in 2009
Data for 2008:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Data for 2009:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
$9.9 trillion in 2008
Size of banking system
$9.8 trillion in 2009
Size of banking system
68.3% in 2008
66.9% in 2009
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
30.5% in 2008
30.3% in 2009
as a percentage of financial system
44.9% in 2008
Five-bank concentration of banking system
44.3% in 2009
18% in 2008
Foreign involvement in banking system
19% in 2009
Data not available for 2008
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for 2009
Yes, in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes, in 2009
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: Policymakers created the Guarantee Program to arrest runs on MMFs.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Reserve Primary Fund, which held $785
million of Lehman’s commercial paper, broke the buck—that is, it reported a net asset value
(NAV) of $0.97 (Kiss 2019, 17; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010; McCabe 2010; SEC 2009).
When the fund’s managers did not quickly restore its NAV to more than the targeted $0.995,
investors who had considered MMFs to be safe assets ran from MMFs across the market (SEC
2009; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010). Between September 10, 2008, and October 1, 2008,
they withdrew $439 billion from MMFs, including from those considered safer than the
Reserve Primary Fund (Gorton and Metrick 2010; Kim 2013). The withdrawals forced many
MMFs to sell assets at lower prices (Schmidt et al. 2016; Shafran 2020).
The Department of the Treasury created the Guarantee Program to “insure the holdings of
any publicly offered eligible money market mutual fund—both retail and institutional—that
pays a fee to participate in the program” with the hope of stopping these runs (Department
of the Treasury 2008d).
2. Part of a Package: The Guarantee Program was created alongside other programs
to assist MMFs, including the Federal Reserve’s AMLF and MMIFF.
The Treasury announced the program on September 19, 2008. That same day, the Federal
Reserve announced its Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (Federal Reserve 2020). The AMLF, like the Guarantee Program,
was created to strengthen MMFs. It provided banks with financing by purchasing highquality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from MMFs (Federal Reserve 2020). By
doing so, the Federal Reserve aimed to help MMFs meet investor demands for redemptions
and maintain a healthy level of market liquidity (Federal Reserve 2020).
In October 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF), which was meant to aid the money-market industry by providing liquidity
to its investors (Federal Reserve 2010; Wiggins 2020).
3. Legal Authority: The Treasury used its authority under the Gold Reserve Act of
1934, which had established the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), to create the
Guarantee Program.
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as amended in 1976, allowed the secretary of the Treasury,
with the president’s approval, to use the ESF to fulfill “obligations of the Government in
the International Monetary Fund on orderly exchange arrangements and a stable system of
exchange rates” (Gold Reserve Act 1934; Bretton Woods Amendments 1976; USC 1973;
Department of the Treasury 2008d). The Act allowed the Treasury to “deal in gold, foreign
exchange, and other instruments of credit and securities" (Gold Reserve Act 1934;
Department of the Treasury 2008d). Prior to the Guarantee Program, the Treasury used the
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ESF for various purposes, including the stabilization of exchange rates, stabilization loans,
and warehousing (Humpage 2008).
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), among others, questioned whether the language
of the Gold Reserve Act allowed the Treasury to use the ESF to support MMFs. In October
2008, Congress passed legislation that prohibited the Treasury from doing so again without
specific Congressional approval (Shafran 2020). Congress temporarily provided that
approval in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, although in that case the Treasury did not
reintroduce an MMF guarantee (CARES Act 2020; McNamara 2020).
4. Administration: The Treasury administered the Guarantee Program.
The Treasury ran the Guarantee Program (Department of the Treasury 2008d). To enroll in
the program, MMF managers had to submit a signed agreement and disclose information to
the Treasury about their funds, including the number of shares the MMF held, their NAV,
their maturity, and the total number of shareholders (Department of the Treasury 2008b;
Department of the Treasury 2008a).
In cases where an MMF exercised the Treasury’s guarantee, the MMF was required to notify
the Treasury (Shafran 2020).
5. Governance: Congress exercised its oversight powers over the Guarantee
Program. Other regulatory agencies also announced rules pertaining to the
program.
Several private and governmental agencies adopted new regulatory guidance to support the
Guarantee Program. For instance, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority released
guidance on how MMFs should disclose their involvement in the Guarantee Program (FINRA
2008). The Internal Revenue Service also released regulatory guidance regarding the tax
effects of the Guarantee Program (IRS 2008b; IRS 2008a).
Congress maintained some oversight over the Guarantee Program. Notably, the COP
examined the efficacy of the government’s economic programs, including the Guarantee
Program (COP 2009).
6. Communication: The Treasury said that the Guarantee Program was meant to
maintain confidence in the MMF industry and to ensure global financial stability.
On September 19, 2008, when the Guarantee Program was announced, the Treasury noted
two goals: to maintain confidence in MMFs, which were an important financial instrument
in the US, and to promote global financial stability (Department of the Treasury 2008d).
Then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Paulson, Jr., in testimony before Congress, stated
that such interventions were designed to protect American taxpayers by stabilizing the
financial system (Paulson 2008).
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7. Size of Guarantees: The Guarantee Program was meant to cover 100% of investor
losses in eligible MMFs once an MMF had been liquidated.
The Guarantee Program was designed to cover 100% of asset shortfalls once an MMF had
been liquidated (Shafran 2020).
8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The Treasury used $50 billion from the ESF to fund
the Guarantee Program.
The Treasury used $50 billion from the ESF to back the Guarantee Program (Shafran 2020).
Architects of the program believed that because they were fighting a liquidity run, any losses
would be minimal and the $50 billion sufficient to insure the $3.5 trillion MMF market
(Shafran 2020).
9. Eligible Institutions: All MMFs regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 were eligible for the Guarantee Program. Additionally, an
MMF had to have an NAV of $0.995 or more on September 19, 2008.
The Guarantee Program was available to all MMFs regulated under Rule 2a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Department of the Treasury 2008f). Rule 2a-7
differentiates MMFs from other mutual funds and limits their “credit, interest-rate, and
liquidity risks consistent with the funds’ maintenance of a stable NAV” (McCabe 2010). These
MMFs, both retail and institutional and taxable and nontaxable, were required to register
with the SEC and maintain a normal share price of $1 per share (Department of the Treasury
2008f). Only MMFs could enroll in the Guarantee Program (Department of the Treasury
2008c). Fund managers wishing to participate were required to enroll in the Guarantee
Program starting in October 2008 and then extend their participation, if they wished, once
the Guarantee Program was extended (Department of the Treasury 2009; Department of the
Treasury 2008g; Department of the Treasury 2008h).
Participating MMFs were required to have an NAV at or above $0.995 on September 19, 2008
(Department of the Treasury 2008f). Architects of the program chose this cutoff to prevent
damaging runs while at the same time not curing “losses that had already been sustained
(because of credit mistakes) at the few funds that were already in trouble” (Shafran 2020).
At its height, the Guarantee Program covered 366 MMF-management companies and 1,486
individual funds (Shafran 2020). All of the largest MMF firms had enrolled by October 1,
2008 (Macey 2011). However, as liquidity returned to the financial system, not all
institutions remained in the program (Shafran 2020).
10. Eligible Accounts: The Treasury limited the Guarantee Program to MMFs held on
September 19, 2008.
The Treasury only insured MMF balances held as of the program’s announcement on
September 19, 2008 (Department of the Treasury 2008f). This was intended to discourage
investors from moving money from traditional banks to MMFs to take advantage of the new
guarantee. Policymakers worried that the program could create a run on traditional banks
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(Shafran 2020). Given that investors who invested in MMFs after the announcement of the
Guarantee Program were not covered by the guarantee, there was no incentive to shift funds
from traditional banks to MMFs to take advantage of it.
11. Fees: Quarterly fees for the Guarantee Program originally ranged from 1 to 1.5
basis points, depending on the NAV of the MMF. Over time, the fees increased.
When it announced the Guarantee Program in September 2008, the Treasury charged
quarterly fees to participating institutions that varied according to the NAV of the MMF
(Department of the Treasury 2008f). For MMFs with NAVs equal to or greater than $0.9975
at the close of business on September 19, 2008, the Treasury charged one basis point on the
size of the insured fund (Department of the Treasury 2008f). For MMFs with NAVs equal to
or greater than $0.995 on September 19, 2008, the Treasury charged 1.5 basis points
(Department of the Treasury 2008f). These fees were meant to cover the first three months
of participation in the program (Department of the Treasury 2008f).
When the Guarantee Program was extended in November 2008, the Treasury increased the
quarterly fees. For MMFs with NAVs equal to or greater than $0.9975 on September 19, 2008,
it raised the fee to 1.5 basis points (Department of the Treasury 2008h). For MMFs with NAVs
equal to or greater than $0.995 on September 19, 2008, it raised the fee to 2.2 basis points
(Department of the Treasury 2008h). These fees were meant to cover the costs of
participation in the program until April 30, 2009 (Department of the Treasury 2008h).
The Treasury revised the fees again in March 2009, when it extended the program until
September 2009 (Department of the Treasury 2009). This time, the fees covered a six-month
period rather than a quarter (Department of the Treasury 2009). For MMFs with NAVs equal
to or greater than $0.9975 on September 19, 2008, the Treasury charged 1.5 basis points on
the size of the insured fund (Department of the Treasury 2009). For MMFs with NAVs equal
to or greater than $0.995 on September 19, 2008, it charged 2.3 basis points (Department of
the Treasury 2009).
The Treasury decided on the size of the fees to encourage mass participation while also
charging “something that would be meaningful as a percentage of the margins earned by
most managers” (Shafran 2020). The three payments MMFs made summed to 4 to 6 basis
points per year, depending on their NAVs (Shafran 2020). This range was based on the
Treasury’s estimate that MMF profits ranged from 4 to 10 basis points per year (Shafran
2020). Moreover, though the Department of the Treasury sought to charge firms fees that
were meaningful, the COP said that “the fees the government charged the financial
institutions for the guarantees in all of the programs were lower than fees commercial
entities would have charged for the same protection,” leading to potential moral-hazard
concerns (COP 2009).
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12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: To exercise the guarantee, fund managers were
required to notify the Treasury and halt redemptions. Then the MMF was
liquidated and any shortfalls covered by the Guarantee Program.
The Guarantee Program was created as a form of “death insurance,” meaning that an MMF
manager who wanted to exercise the program’s guarantee had to shut down the fund
(Shafran 2020). To exercise the guarantee, the NAV of an MMF had to fall below $0.995, what
was termed a “Triggering Event” (Shafran 2020). The parent company, then, could restore
the value of the MMF (Shafran 2020). However, if the parent company decided not to restore
the value of the MMF or could not do so, the MMF could file a claim with the Treasury within
24 hours of the Triggering Event (Shafran 2020). Upon filing the claim, the MMF would be
required to stop redemptions. Next, within five days, the assets in the MMF would be
liquidated, with the proceeds going to investors (Shafran 2020). Within 30 days of the
Triggering Event, the MMF could file a claim with the Treasury to cover any shortfalls
(Shafran 2020). Requiring an MMF that used the guarantee to liquidate created incentives
for parent companies to restore the NAVs of their MMFs. Liquidation would have “draconian”
consequences, including negative reputational effects (COP 2009).
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: There were no other
conditions associated with the Guarantee Program.
The Guarantee Program had no other conditions (Department of the Treasury 2008f).
14. Duration: The Guarantee Program was originally scheduled to last three months
but was extended twice and ultimately lasted a year.
The Guarantee Program was originally established for three months, after which the
secretary of the Treasury was to decide whether to extend or terminate it (Department of
the Treasury 2008f). Later, in November 2008, the Treasury extended the Guarantee
Program until the end of April 2009 (Department of the Treasury 2008h). Again, the
secretary of the Treasury had the power to extend or terminate the Guarantee Program after
this date (Department of the Treasury 2008h). In March 2009, the secretary of the Treasury
extended the Guarantee Program through September 18, 2009, on which date the Guarantee
Program ultimately ended as scheduled (Department of the Treasury 2009).
Architects of the Guarantee Program have noted that a clear termination date was crucial so
that “everyone [would] understand we were not looking to permanently reshape the
industry” (Shafran 2020).
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